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Chapter 1

Contexts, Constraints and Resources in the Development of European Education Space and European Education Policy[1]

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The fundamental argument of this chapter, as explained in the Introduction to the volume, is to set out briefly the historical, economic, political and educational contexts from and through which something that might be referred to as a European Education Space (EES) and a European Education Policy (EEP) emerged, and the kinds of institutional and discursive legacies, resources and constraints that these contexts provided, which enabled—but in no sense either required or guaranteed--the development of the EES and the EEP. Having discussed the sources of 'Europe' and 'governance', I will go on in the main part of the chapter to outline the emergence of what it will be argued are the distinct spheres of European Education *Space*(EES) and European Education *Policy* (EEP). Through this process, I will develop the approach to educational governance that will be adopted, and briefly sketch some significant wider contextual features without which it is difficult to comprehend the nature and purposes of the EES and EEP. The chapter ends with a brief discussion of the 'place' of the EES and EEP in the relationships between globalisation and Europeanisation.

A Methodological Note

The basic methodological starting point of this chapter (and also of Chapter 6) is that while we have a range of excellent and insightful studies of the enigma known as European Education Policy, they tend collectively to be insufficiently 'critical' in the sense in which Robert Cox uses that term. He distinguishes what he calls 'problem-solving' theory from 'critical' theory, where "The general aim of problem solving is to make [social and power] relationships and institutions [into which they are organized]
work smoothly by dealing effectively with particular sources of trouble. . . .The strength of the problem-solving approach lies in its ability to fix limits or parameters to a problem area and to reduce the statement of a particular problem to a limited number of variables which are amenable to relatively close and precise examination" (Cox, 1996:88). By contrast, 'Critical theory, unlike problem-solving theory, does not take institutions and social power relations for granted but calls them into question by concerning itself with their origins and how and whether they might be in the process of changing. It is directed toward an appraisal of the very framework for action . . . which problem-solving theory accepts as its parameters" (Cox, 1996:88-9).

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It will be the argument here that most of the work on EES and EEP has fallen into the problem solving category, especially when its focus is confined to investigating the 'effects of' European education policy on national education policies'. This formulation contains most of the elements that get in the way of a more effective understanding of EES and EEP.
They assume:

- a level of correspondence/equivalence between regional and national education policies
- a homogenisation of the roles, scope and place of education policy
- a hierarchical relationship between Europe and national levels
- methodological nationalist and statist assumptions
- more specifically, that the Lisbon agenda and the OMC both have relatively fixed meanings and that they jointly constitute and comprise the agenda of European Education Policy

The point about this list is that it is made up of precisely the kinds of categories and phenomena that Critical Theory insists have to be problematised, and that is the fundamental basis for such analyses

Globalisation and Europeanisation

Conceptions of the relationship between globalisation and Europeanisation tend to be disciplinary specific. From the point of view of International Relations, perhaps the dominant interested discipline, one way that the complexity of this relationship has been conceived is through what Rosamond (2002a) refers to as 'Castells' paradox' – that 'European integration is, at the same time, a reaction to the process of globalisation, and its most advanced expression' (Castells, 2000, 348). This is a very useful position from which to begin our analysis of the relationship between globalisation, Europeanisation and education, since in essence our response to the paradox is that it is both, and that recognising why that may be the case is an effective way of tracing out the nature and consequences of the relationship. The basic argument is that Europe, in the sense of the EU, is involved in the construction of globalisation *and* that globalisation frames economic, political, cultural, etc possibilities for Europe.
In terms of the first of these, Castells' argument that Europe is the highest expression of globalisation assumes that the relationship between them is not a hierarchical one. This is a key part of the argument here, for the global-Europe-national hierarchy appears to be assumed in much work on education---possibly following its use in IR, which Rosamond discusses. From our point of view, globalisation is best seen as a level of abstraction rather than as some kind of entity equivalent to 'Europe' that similarly 'contains', and seeks to order, economic, political, cultural, etc activities. More appropriate conceptions, then, are global economy, or institutions of global governance. Conceiving of the relationship in this way removes the possibility of a hierarchical relationship between two levels, because in a sense they are not two levels, but different instances of the same level. Rosamond suggest that there are two ways in which Europe can be seen as a realization of globalisation (24). The first is as a form of liberal market order. This emerges most clearly through the example of

‘competitiveness’ as the master discourse emerging from the Lisbon agenda. (The argument in the rest of this paragraph is based on Dale (2003), a paper presented at the first GENIE conference). As it is translated into practice, what competitiveness means is competition with the United States and Japan above all, which is seen as essential because Europe’s relatively poor comparative level of competitiveness is perceived to be the major threat to its future success. The crucial point here is that the very competition between the triad regions (at its simplest, America, Europe and Asia) contributes to, indeed constructs, ‘globalisation’, and in turn draws on and is shaped by it. However, globalization is not reducible to inter-triad competition and does not exhaust it, because on the one hand, inter-triad competition is not and could not be a ‘fight to the death’, and on the other, there are economic, political and ecological limits to competition, while the consequences of the ‘global governance’ set up in part to regulate that competition are not confined to the triad, but reverberate across the world—one of the possible definitions of globalization. This argument that has the great theoretical virtue of undermining the hierarchical conception of the relationship between scales.

The second way in which Rosamond suggests that Europe may be seen as a realization of globalization is as a ‘hybrid form of multi-level polity’, which sees it as ‘an agent for the unraveling of (Westphalian) European space, the spread of certain policy orthodoxies across the continent and the emergence of hybrid forms of governance that depart from the models most associated with twentieth-century European political economy’ (2005, 24)). Here, for us, the crucial point is that Lisbon specifies ‘Europe’, and not Member States (MS) as the level at which competitiveness is to be achieved. It indicates an incipient shift from ‘national government’ to ‘European governance’ of the Lisbon agenda.

Rather more attention has been paid to the other element of Castells’ paradox, European integration as a reaction to globalization, and certainly it has featured more prominently in discussions of the consequences for education policy. The ‘obvious’ way of approaching it might seem to be to look for the ‘effects’ of the ‘global’ on the regional, the nature of the indirect/instrumental relationship between globalisation and EU, and from there to consider what that might mean for EU education policy . This is essentially the position Susan Roberston and I took in the paper we wrote on the effects of regional organisations on education policy (Dale and Robertson (2002)). The argument was that the EU and other regional organisations (NAFTA and APEC) were set up as a defence against globalisation, and the purpose was to ascertain the consequences of this for education policy. This led us quickly to focus on Lisbon, which seemed to be a perfect case for this kind of analysis. However, it rested on implicitly hierarchical, tiered, assumptions about the relationships between the ‘scales’ of global, regional and national, where the regional acted as a kind of ‘collective security’, that required the ‘national’ to cede some of its powers/discretion to the collective/regional, in order to secure its fundamental interests more effectively; this saw the European level somehow ‘mediating’ between the global and the national. This account is quite plausible, even convincing, as far as it goes, especially as it was modified in the case of the regional organisations to the argument set out in the last paragraph that far from operating at a different scale from globalisation, it was the competition between the ‘triad’ regional organisations that comprised the main force and driver of ‘globalisation’.

However, certainly in the case of Europe, because of its qualitatively different basis, history and range of objectives from other regional and international organisations, promoting economic competitiveness, acting as what we might call a 'collective competition state', is not sufficient to account for its relationship with education policy. Even in terms of Lisbon, it is not sufficient to focus only on fostering competitiveness. The other components of Lisbon may be less prominent and less promoted, but they are nevertheless extremely important in terms of the wider view of Europe, especially in the case of what is seen as defining 'Europe' and distinguishing it from the United States in particular, the 'European Social Model', which underpins the 'social' items on the Lisbon list, and offers the means of integrating the social and the economic. Thus, Lisbon is claimed to represent a version of a more humane and equitable form of and response to global capitalism, where the EU itself has become a model of globalisation, or a 'laboratory of globalisation' (Lamy, quoted in Rosamond 2002a, 9).

One crucial difference between Europe and other regional organisations, that also makes it sui generis as a political-economic cultural entity is that it is a result of 'the founding of a polity by the deliberate interaction of the members of that new polity…(so that) European political integration can fruitfully be seen as an attempt at world-making' (Wagner 2007, 254). We do not need to follow Wagner in going on to argue that Europe represents an alternative form of modernity to the dominant US form, which he refers to as 'Imperial Modernism', to recognise both that there is at least a glimpse or embryo of an alternative 'European' project that is not reducible to economic competition, and that there is a distinct 'Europe-centred' project whose aim is to 'thicken the discourses and institutions of Europe, irrespective of economic competition. And it is a central argument here that that it is very important to recognise that education's expected contributions to that project, both as a medium of competence establishment and building, and as a means of substantiating the idea of Europe, were crucial parts of that project, without which neither the project nor education can be adequately appreciated.

Thickening the idea of Europe itself is also advanced through the relationship with globalisation. As Rosamond puts it, 'globalisation', as a concept, slots into the processes of deliberation and persuasion that characterise institutional interaction in the EU. In this regard it is worth noting that 'globalisation' has been used as an exogenous referent by actors seeking to argue for the further Europeanisation of governance capacity and deeper European economic integration. 'Much of this is bound up with the discursive elaboration of a 'European economy' or of 'European firms', which seek a European-level regulatory framework to assure 'competitiveness' globally. …… Of particular significance is the way in which 'globalisation' has been inserted into the discursive practices of 'norm entrepreneurs' who contribute to the social construction of 'Europe' as a valid and viable economic space populated by discernible European actors. This in turn fits neatly with the continued advocacy of supranational governance solutions'.(Rosamond, 2002, 10)

A further relevant aspect of Europe as region is to be found in the area of geopolitics, where it has clear ambitions that are not wholly without consequences for education. One way in which this emerges is in the shadow of discourses of security rather than of economy. Here, education has not been heavily involved or referred to, though

there are suggestions --e g, in the European Neighbourhood Policy (see Pace)—that education, and especially higher education may be expected to make a significant contribution. While I have deliberately made very little reference to higher education in these chapters, it appears to play a potentially major part in the geopolitical strand of the EU project. This is seen most clearly through activities around the Bologna Process, in particular the development of the European Higher Education Area, the Tuning project (especially through programmes such as Tuning America Latina, for instance) and the Erasmus Mundus programme. Robertson's examples in Chapter ? provide excellent evidence of this expansion Each of these potentially makes a contribution to the project of Europe as a 'player' on world stages in which education would be centrally involved, potentially enabling respectively, access to human resources, ability to control market rules and an ability to shape pattern of HE curriculum.

It is clear, then, that 'Europe', is unusual if not unique among regional and other international organisations in having more than economic ambitions, and seeing its project spreading wider and deeper than short term collective economic benefit.

Governance and the State

A key feature that distinguishes governance from government is that it requires us to problematise, rather than taking for granted, the nature of and the relationships between, the spaces, subjects and coordination of governing—in this case, the governing of education and how it is attempted and achieved at the level of the EU. At its most basic, the problematic of governance may be seen as establishing the coordination of activities and agents that make the work of organisations of all kinds possible. It is fundamentally an issue of who does what, over what area— and then how, why and with what consequences for whom? It thus covers a wide range of questions, around institutional structures, methods of political decision-making and forms of policy instruments, for instance.

In a sense, the key context for the emergence of both 'Europe' and 'governance', and consequently of a EES and EEP, is the spread and intensity of the project of neoliberal globalisation, whose central assumption is the need for the removal of all barriers to free trade, but whose central governing device is to achieve this through harnessing the apparatuses of the state to its own purposes in place of the decommodifying and 'market-taming' role the state had played under social democracy. Rather than merely reforming 'government through minimising regulation', it seeks to construct new ways of reducing transaction costs without resorting to laissez faire. Stephen Gill has characterised as .new constitutionalism….'to separate economic policies from broad political accountability in order to make governments more responsive to the discipline of market forces and correspondingly less responsive to popular-democratic forces and processes […] Central objectives in this discourse are security of property rights and investor freedoms, and market discipline on the state and on labour to secure credibility in the eyes of private investors, e.g. those in both the global currency and capital markets'. (Gill 1998: 5)

So, in terms of the emergence of an idea of 'governance', the most relevant and effective way of beginning to ground the issue is to focus initially on states. The state

has been simultaneously the means by which the conditions of existence of capitalism are most fully assured and a key *institution* of modernity. However, following Santos (2004), the state that was to implement regulation is itself incorporated into the project of neo-liberalism, as regulation is ceded to the market, and emancipation is reduced to market freedom.

Thus, the social-democratic model of the state that was earlier seen as the protector of the principles of modernity and nationhood, and the best possible shell for capitalism (see Jessop 1978) is now seen as a barrier to free trade, and no longer the institutional base that capitalism needs to embed and monitor 'the rules of global economic governance'. That form of the state is seen as increasingly unable to manage the tensions intrinsic to its role as the key institution of both modernity and capitalism . It had been able to manage these tensions largely through its capacity to regulate to protect forms of emancipation that did not rely on the market, to 'decommodify' particular institutions and practices, an approach that reached its high water mark in the *trente glorieuses*, the exceptional 30 years that followed (at least in the West) WWII.. However, as Santos puts it, following the iconic fall of the Berlin Wall, 'The state ceased to be the controlling agency over the articulations among the three pillars of modern regulation (State, market and community) to become the servant of the market and redesign the community to become the same' (2004, 154).

This has come about through a number of changes, many of which can be traced to the changing relationships (in both directions) between globalisation and Europeanisation. They include:

(a) the decline of the national state as the basis of the economy; (without a national economy it is more difficult to build a national welfare state, for instance) with the reversal of the relationship between the economic and the social, from one where the former served the later to its opposite and consequently

(b) the declining influence of borders, especially as constraints on the movement of capital, as well as the growth of international organizations that carry out many of what were formerly regarded as 'national' prerogatives and responsibilities;

(c) the recognition (in the form of the New Public Management see, e g, Kettl, 1997; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004) that many of what had come to be seen as 'obviously' state activites, could, and should, be funded and provided by other, often private, bodies, with benefits to both state expenditure and quality of service;

(d) the dominant role of the state becoming the promotion of national economic prosperity, on the assumption that the wealth so created would trickle down so that all would eventually benefit from it;

(e) the associated shift of state activity towards economic activity; and the accompanying emphasis on 'productive social policy'

and (f) a shift from state to individual responsibility for security and risk, especially in the are of employment.

We should also note the social democratic form of state came to be seen as setting a normative as well as an analytic benchmark, in that it has been seen as the highest realisation of the possibilities of the state acting to ensure that the benefits of capitalism were redistributed—and indeed Zurn and Liebfreid refer to it as the 'Golden Age' of the

state. Central –and, we might argue, unique--to this conception was that all four dimensions of the state distinguished by Zurn and Leibfried (resources, law, legitimacy and welfare) converged in national constellations, and national institutions. What Zurn and Leibfried make clear, however, is that "…the changes over the past 40 years are not merely creases in the fabric of the nation state, but rather an unravelling of the finely woven national constellation of its Golden Age" (Ibid.: 1).. As Edgar Grande (2006, 92) puts it, 'with the new forms of complex governance, the state *form*…loses its monopoly position in the production of collective solutions to collective problems. Collectively binding decisions are no longer taken by the state alone, or among sovereign states, but rather with the involvement of various types of societal actors, sometimes even without governments' (emphasis in original)

Such an accommodation requires not just the 'reform' of existing states but transforming them by constructing new spaces and sectors of *governance.* This fundamentally reflects a shift from the assumption that 'the state does it all' (and must do so, certainly in the area of education) to the recognition that those activities can be defined and divided differently, among different potential agents, and crucially for present purposes, between different scales, with the regional having a role to play, that is increasingly based on its economic competitiveness.

The culmination of these changes came in the Lisbon agenda, where a set of implications and responsibilities for education were elaborated, with the proviso that they could only be met at the level of the Union, not that of individual Member States. The content of the 'Concrete Future Objectives' for education systems enunuciated at Lisbon may not have been especially dramatic or novel in itself, but the fact that it was accepted by MS represented the beginning of a new stage in Europe's involvement in education and training, the framing of which we will now discuss. More than this, the changes listed above created a highly critical stance toward existing provision in many areas, which were seen as being out of date and not up to the task of modernizing Europe in the ways required by Lisbon, and education was no exception to this.

European Education Space and European Education Policy

However, that apparently simple statement conceals enormous complexities. Something of the nature of the problems it generates is caught in the terminology used to describe/locate educational activities and possibilities at a European level, which presents a fascinating range of alternatives. Hingel, for instance, refers in the course of one paragraph to a 'European *Space* of Education', a European *Model* of Education, deriving from common principles, and a European *House* of Education, with its foundations in the annual meeting of MS Ministers of Education (2001,4), while later (9) he refers to a European *Area* of Education . The range of terms is not only fascinating, however, but also very instructive. It is clear that Hingel uses the different terms to refer to different and non-substitutable elements or characteristics of an emergent –and elusive--'European education', and that the terms chosen reflect its novelty---though perhaps most importantly they represent its 'existence' as experienced by a senior member of the DG for Education. When we come to consider issues around the scope and nature of 'European education', what most importantly and most significantly distinguishes it is that it must be assumed to be different somehow from MS' 'national' education. But that then begs the further question, 'different in what it does and/or in how it does it ?' The development of 'European

education' over the period since Hingel was writing has both produced a clearer empirical emergence of what it involves, and a more precise theoretical appreciation of its nature, and these have led us to distinguish between the *presence* of 'European education', and the *activities* of 'European education'. This is reflected here and in chapter 6 in the argument that it is very useful to separate the two terms that have been most commonly used to conceptualise the issues we are considering here, European Education *Space*, and European Education *Policy*.

These terms have typically been used as if they were interchangeable, as if it were a matter of relative indifference which of them was used to name what was seen as essentially the same phenomenon. However, a key argument underlying the two chapters will be that the terms do indeed denote different analytic areas, which, though they overlap and interact in multiple ways, are not reducible to each other, and that focussing on one neither means that the other can be ignored, or that access to the other is ipso facto guaranteed.

These arguments will be elaborated and exemplified in the chapters, but it will be useful to develop them a little further here. First (and as will be elaborated in Chapter 6), these spaces and policies are not to be regarded as equivalent to, or upscaled versions of, national education spaces and policies; they are qualitatively, and not just quantitatively, different. They rest on the claim that the European Education *Space* can be seen as an opportunity structure framed *formally* by Treaty responsibilities, *substantively* by the Lisbon agenda and the European Social Model, and *historically* by the 'pre-Lisbon' education activities of the European Commission. European Education *Policy*, by contrast, is framed by not just the Open Method of Coordination, and the relevant Directorates General-- Education, pre-eminently, but also Employment, Social Inclusion and Research-- but by existing Member State policies and preferences—and, in addition, what has been rather overlooked in the debates around these issues, existing conceptions of the nature and capacity of 'education', which, it will be suggested, have a existence that is relatively independent of, and pervade, in different ways, all MS education policies.

European Education Space

As the first marker of the European Education Space (EES), there is little disagreement that the formal treaty designation of education as a national responsibility is accepted as fundamentally defining the terrain. In a sense, then, the EES is defined by negatives, what is not possible.

Moreover, 'Europe' does not have anything approaching the equivalent of national Ministries of Education, with their range of services and bureaucratic and professional support. And it clearly dos not speak with a single voice, or inflection (see for instance Jones' (2008) account of the contests between the European Council and the European Commission over the wording of a highly strategic document). On the other hand, ' Europe', and the Commission in particular, is not as wholly excluded from education policy making as might be assumed from the Treaty articles (for a rather different but nevertheless converging view of this suggestion, see Hingel (2001)). Flexible interpretations of Article 149.1, for instance, which indicates that 'the Treaty states that 'The Community shall contribute to the development of quality education

by encouraging cooperation between Member States and, if necessary, by supporting and supplementing their actions, while fully respecting the responsibility of Member States for the content of teaching and the organization of education systems and their linguistic and cultural diversity', opened the door to considerable 'agenda amplification', particularly through the 'tofu'-like nature (with no taste of its own, it takes on the taste of whatever flavour it is attached to) of the concept of 'quality' (see Dale (2007) for an exemplification of this, in the shape of '16 Quality Indicators of European Education' already being developed in the late 1990s). And if we take that into account, beyond this, the actions of the Community in the field of education should aim at

- 'developing the European dimension in education
- encouraging the mobility of students and teachers
- promoting co-operation between educational establishments
- exchange of information an experiences
- encouraging the development of distance education' (Article 149.2)

we can clearly see that educational activity on the part of 'Europe', and the Commission in particular was clearly not entirely without possibilities---though it is also crucial not to forget that any European actions within education have to be approved by MS.
This means that, though it may be to a degree skirted or reinterpreted quite creatively, in the ways just mentioned, in the end the formal possibilities for developing a European education policy, in the terms in which that is normally conceived, are strictly limited. The EU has no discretion over the areas that dominate national education politics and policies in most MS. Questions about the distribution of educational opportunities, allocation of school places, distribution of available funding between different levels of the education system, etc, are no concern of the EU. However, that would only be a problem for the EU if it wished to intervene in such issues, which carry intense 'political' loading in all MS. We have become used to associating 'education policy' with precisely such issues, that are everywhere contested, but on very nationally specific grounds, with nationally specific understandings of the stakes involved.

There is one further element of the 'education system' of Europe that shows how misleading it is to assume that because it does not adhere to the assumed pattern of stateness, then it cannot act within education. This is what might be called the obverse of the famous 'democratic deficit'. This may create problems for legitimation but it does to a degree 'liberate' European policy from the need to follow electoral cycles and have an eye to electoral pressures. Indeed, one consequence of Article 149 might be seen as a fundamental 'a-politicisation' of education policy, that, as we will see, could be exploited and developed through the construction of 'de-nationalised' expertise.

However, we should note that (a) there are a number of possible loopholes, or opportunities for policy entrepreneurship or agenda amplification, contained in the exclusion of vocational education from the subsidiarity rule, and from the possibility of the Union intervening to assist Member States (MS) in improving the quality of their education, the latter of which we will take up later; (b) policy emerges also develops in the interstices of subsidiarity, and emerges contingently, rather than in any determined way; and (c) most importantly, the role assigned to education in the Lisbon process itself effectively bends and stretches, if it does not break, the formal

designation of education, not least in the statement that the Lisbon goals in education can only be met at the level of the Community, not at national level.

The Lisbon agenda and education

The Lisbon agenda, and its immediate and broader implications, is, of course, as has been widely recognised, extensive and very diverse, possibly to the point of mutual contradiction (see Dale 2003), and, indeed, the problems generated by that diversity of goals and their possible implications for education have become the staple of studies of European Education Policy. However, we might see two significant problems with this effective equation of 'Lisbon' with the EES—and EEP.

First, it seems often to be overlooked, or taken for granted, that what crucially distinguishes the EES as framed by Lisbon from national education spaces is that it is concerned with Education *only in so far as it may be seen as related to those purposes and implications.* That is to say, the EES is characterised by its relatively abbreviated and concentrated scope and purpose. Many of the issues that press most directly on national Ministries of Education—issues like access, equity, efficiency, effectiveness—are relatively peripheral to the EES, on grounds of both substance—their relevance to Lisbon—and form—education as a MS responsibility. The problem is that while the latter is frequently recognised and its implications discussed, the former seems often to be subsumed under a general assumption that European education policy is in most relevant dimensions similar to national education policies. Policies are assumed to be made in the same way, *mutatis mutandis*, by similar bodies, for similar purposes, and cover similar kinds of areas. The consequence of these assumptions is that the national can be scaled up to the regional with no loss of meaning; European education policy is formally directly comparable to, and accessible as a model of, existing national education policy. Crucially, this informs the level of analysis at least as much at as that of description; that is to say, the national provides the template, or benchmark against which European education policy is matched and judged, in terms of its 'authenticity' and its fitness for purpose, and the comparative perspective through which it is analysed. This issue will be considered at greater length in Chapter 6

The second problem is a tendency to focus on the immediate issues, such as the Lisbon declaration and the nature of the Open Method of Coordination, or Communications published by the Education Directorate General. Such studies have produced a large quantity of interesting and important material, some of it containing very insightful and revealing analyses. The outcome of this is that Lisbon and, to a lesser extent the OMC, have taken on an iconic status in the analysis of EU education activities.

This is by no means inappropriate; they are immensely important, interesting and fruitful areas of inquiry. The problem is that they tend to be accepted on to the analytic terrain 'on their own terms', as it were, already formed and known. However, it is widely and clearly acknowledged that the Lisbon declaration was not the only way that the EU's policy dilemma could have been conceived and represented—indeed, there is a considerable literature on this. (e g, Rodrigues 2004, Esping – Anderson, 2002). So, though it may possibly be formally acknowledged as one particular *condensation* and representation of the problems and solutions that faced the EU, its iconic status means that that particular condensation and representation remains fairly unchallenged, almost 'naturalised', at least in its diagnosis. That is, it is recognised that 'Lisbon' is a political slogan but it is nevertheless accepted relatively

unproblematically as the basis for analysis, and interestingly, this seems to have remained the case, certainly in discussions of education, following the major shifts in emphasis and direction (though with the rubric unchanged) brought about by the Mid Term Review. Effectively, 'Lisbon' is taken unproblematically as not only representing but exhausting the issues facing the European economy. It becomes reified and frozen, and strangely unreflexive; competitiveness and 'social cohesion', and the relationships between them, are taken as the 'same' in 2008 as in 2000, despite the years of intense effort to change them.

There is also a strong tendency to abstract Lisbon from the wider political economic issues facing Europe and the rest of the world. These are fully recognised in the shape of the dominant 'competitiveness ' agenda, but this itself does not exhaust problems at a global level. This is, of course, how the agenda is represented 'officially' in Communications on Education, which all take 'the Lisbon goals' as continuing, and assumedly unchanged, benchmarks, which shape the *constellation* of issues for policy, as represented, most notably, in the Detailed Work Programme. As the chapters in these volumes indicate, several alternative constellations of issues and representations of the nature of Lisbon for education are possible.

Finally, Lisbon often seems to be taken as the sole, and not just the dominant, *catalyst* for, the emergence of European education policy in the forms in which we encounter it. This leads to another form of this tendency—to which I certainly have fallen prey—which is almost to assume that there was no European education policy before Lisbon, or, if there was, it was so different that it could be ignored with no penalty. Indeed, not only is there such a history, but it is clear that it continues to influence conceptions of the scope and boundaries of the EES.

European Education Policy

In terms of the EEP, the main tendency in the literature on education has been to focus on the 'effects' of a putative 'European education policy' on MS' domestic education policies. The assumption often seems to be that the main purpose/goal/objective of European education policy is to replace or at least (more commonly) to modify national education policies, in whole or in part, in the sense of having effects on them that would not otherwise have come about (in other words, very much like the highly popular academic tendency to see, and/or look for, evidence of Europe's' influence through its effects on domestic policies—which may include the emergence of hybrids, etc). This is not to say either that there are no such effects, or that they are not important, or that it is not important to look for them; it is, though to say that confining ourselves to such searches unnecessarily, and misleadingly, limits our capacity to understand the nature of European education policy. As was argued in our discussion of approaches to the EES, it essentially adopts a 'problem-solving' conception of the issues rather than a critical one. It limits the range of both outputs, outcomes and consequences, and the number of variables to be taken into account in explaining them. Interestingly, there appears to be much more interest in searching for the domestic effects of European education policy than in assessing the degree to which it attains the objectives set for it, reflecting a tendency to look for effects on MS education policies rather than on'Europe'. Such an approach also leads directly to two further assumptions, to be examined further in Chapter 6, that European education policy exists only in so far as it can be shown to have achieved

these things, and that implicit in all the above is a zero sum assumption about the relationship between Europe and MS education policies.

The alternative argument to be developed here about the nature of European education policy is both formal and substantive. Formally, on the one hand its scope is framed by the EES. On the other hand, its content is framed by the distinct and different place and form taken by 'policy' in European educational governance. Substantively, in order to adequately come to terms with the mandate, capacity and governance of European education, it is necessary to problematise the agendas that education is summoned to address at the European level. These agendas are taken to include, as well as the Lisbon agenda, the European Social Model, and Europe as an entity.

Beyond this, what is also needed is an analysis of where both the agenda and the issues to be addressed, *and* the resources for response come from, because they have a crucial and independent effect on the framing of both. Further key issues here are what is conceived of as mandate, capacity and governance of European education, where those conceptions come from, how they differ from national conceptions, how they are combined, and what constraints, opportunities, resources, etc they offer. These issues are discussed more fully in Chapter 6.

In more formal terms, the European agendas for education are seen as part of the particular 'hegemonic project' that fundamentally underlies the Community enterprise, and that includes the three agendas noted above for education. A hegemonic project is taken as political project advanced by coalitions between different groups and interests; where the main basis of making the coalitions coherent is sets of representations of (a) the nature of problems facing the (particular) world, and (b) how they might be overcome. Education plays a key role in hegemonic projects, and the overall hegemonic project may be seen as the basis of its prioritisation and approach to its basic role of addressing the core problems of education (which are set out briefly below). And this also means that there are changes not only in the problems to be addressed by education, but also in the *ways* that they are to be addressed, and the *nature* of education's contribution to them; further, not just the contents of education programmes, but the theories of how they are to contribute to the required changes, and the means through which they are to bring about, or contribute to, the change specified in the hegemonic project, themselves change. These further, rather less obvious, aspects of the differences between national and European education policy are further elaborated in the final section of this chapter, and in Chapter 6

Taking this range of differences between European and national education policy, and their consequences for the governance of education at the two levels, into account, clearly requires some revision of the theories of governance developed to account for national systems. Essentially, it means shedding, or at least bracketing, the methodologically nationalist and statist assumptions (see Dale and Robertson 2007) that have characterised the study of educational governance. One way of doing this is to start from a version of Przeworski and Teune's principle of replacing the 'names of things' with 'variables'. What that means here is that we look for the fundamental purposes and activities associated with the governance of education rather than with the particular means we have become accustomed to associate with achieving them. If

we move a step further, and define education governance as *the means of bringing about the relationship between the multiple goals of education and the ways that education can bring about change*, then we can recognise more clearly the nature, sources and consequences of the less visible and tangible differences between European and national education governance. In this context, 'the ways that education can bring about change' are fundamentally framed and limited by the nature of the EES. We shall take up this point in much more detail in Chapter 6, where we shall introduce the distinction between 'education programmes' and what will be referred to as their 'programme ontology', the ways that education can bring about change, and suggest that the Open Method of Coordination is best understood as such a programme ontology.

In terms of the substance of EEP, it is suggested that the hegemonic project of Europe is made up of three very broad and basic elements; economic competitiveness, developing a European Social Model, and enhancing 'Europe's' claims to be a distinct and significant political/economic/cultural entity. And to repeat the point made earlier in this chapter, this means that Europe's education agenda is rather more restricted than that of its component MS, though it is also necessary to recall the point that the relationship between the two levels is neither zero-sum, or top down, but involves both levels, and influence working in both directions.

It is very widely recognised that EEP is fundamentally a response to the Lisbon goals and especially the competitiveness agenda, particularly as it has been further prioritised following the Mid Term Review[2] of the Lisbon process, with a heavy emphasis on the need for Europe to move towards becoming a Knowledge Economy. Indeed, this has been the explicit purpose of education policy since 2000, the basis of the Concrete Future Objectives for education and for the Detailed Work Plans through which education systems would achieve the contribution to the achievement of the Lisbon goals set out in Education and Training 2010. However, as we see in Chapter 6, the possibilities framed by the EES channel the policy responses to the Lisbon agenda.

Education and the European Social Model

The second, substantive parameter both limits and directs legitimate European intervention in Education We have already emphasised the centrality of the 'master discourse' of Lisbon, competitiveness, as far as education policy and efforts are concerned. However, we should recall that Lisbon also saw a key role for education in contributing to the European Social Model and European social policy, where the central features are 'investment in people' and 'building an active welfare state' effectively, 'productive social policy'. The first of these means that 'Europe's education and training systems need to adapt both to the demands of the knowledge society and to the need of an improved level and quality of employment' (Lisbon Presidency Conclusions para 25).

[2] A 'main political orientation' following the 2005 mid term review of the Lisbon process is that 'new priorities (be) defined for national education policies, i e, turning schools into open learning centres, providing support to (all) population groups, using the Internet and multimedia' (Rodrigues 2004, 5)

A key point to be noted here is that the Lisbon summit 'does not acknowledge education as a "teleological" policy area, an area in itself..(it) is part of social policy, labour market and overall economic policy' (Gornitzka 2005,17). There is also evidence that the high profile of education is due as much to pressures from the wider social policy area, and especially the employment area, as it is to pressure from Education Ministers, for instance. Gabor Halasz, for instance, suggests that 'Most of the motives that lead to the need for policy harmonisation in education can be found outside the sector…(and) the strongest force that leads to policy harmonization in education is, even if this sector resists this, that it is not possible to draw sharp borderlines between different sectors'. He goes on to list a number of social and employment policy related interventions that involve educational inputs, and concludes that, '(by the time of the 2000 National Action Plans for Employment) it became clear for education misters that if they remained aloof from the rapidly developing policy-coordination process and if the education sector did not develop its own procedure for this, co-ordination of policies in their sectors will (sic) be done by others' (Halasz, 2003, 3, 4). He concludes that 'Since the middle of the nineties the non-education sector players have been successful both in extending the scope of employment policy to issues that traditionally have belonged to the jurisdiction of the education sector and in pushing these issues up to community level. As a consequence, not only the community level sectoral players..but also those at the national level….. could have the feeling that an increasing number of education policy issues are dealt with in the framework of the common employment policy' (ibid, 7)

One of the main implications of this discussion lie in the question of how far 'European education' may be becoming a distinct sector in its own right, distinct from, and parallel to, national education sectors, and this is taken up in Chapter 6

Education and Europe as an entity

We have emphasised several times above how education supports Europe as an entity is by its very existence, or by the implicit acceptance of its existence. At one level GENIE itself is taken as an example of this, at another Wagner's conception of Europe as a 'world making'project. It is notable in the policy of emphasising 'Europe' as the subject of action sentences—most notably in the Lisbon declaration itself—thereby reinforcing both its presence and its competence And as Ase Gornitzka puts it, writing about the OMC and education, ultimately, the key point was that the need for a common education policy was accepted by MS (2006, 14)

The Place of Education in EU policy

Having discussed the EES and the EEP I want to conclude this chapter with a brief excursus on what I will call the 'place' of education in European policy, which will also act as a link to Chapter 6. By the 'place' of education, I mean the *nature* of its contribution and to how it fits into the projects to with which it is associated. *How* is it assumed that education will contribute to those ends? A very simple example may be helpful here. In post war social democracy it was assumed that education could

contribute most effectively by expanding equality of opportunity by bureaucratic administration of access and availability; this often took the form of comprehensive schools, for instance. By contrast, in the 19980s and 1990s, the idea was that education could best contribute to the wider social project of expanding wealth through markets, by making education and schools behave themselves in market-like ways. This relationship is rarely studied, but it is crucial to a full understanding of the nature of education and how it is defined and administered. That is especially the case when we are dealing with an entity that appears in many respects sufficiently similar to national education systems to justify using them as a model for analysis, but which is, as has been argued here sufficiently different to make such comparisons misleading.

I have tried in this chapter to demonstrate that through showing the sui generis character of European education as a space and a policy, and Figure is intended to provide a way of conceiving of the place of education at a European level.

Figure 1. The Place of Education in European policy

HEGEMONIC PROJECT	**PLACE OF EDUCATION**	**MECHANISM**	**IMPLICATIONS FOR/DRIVERS OF EDUCATION GOVERNANCE**
CONSTRUCTING EUROPE, ECONOMICALLY, POLITICALLY, CULTURALLY	**OMC AS PROGRAMME ONTOLOGY**	**COMMON EU POLICY PARADIGM AND TAXONOMIES**	**?PARALLEL? EUROPEAN AND NATIONAL 'EDUCATION' SECTORS**

As the Figure shows, it is not possible to consider the place of education in isolation from the purposes which it is to serve, on the one hand, nor helpful to do so without indicating some of the consequences of that place. The first column, then, describes the hegemonic project of the EU, as it has been briefly set out in this chapter. It is the second column where we find the 'place' of education. Here it is argued that the place of education has to be framed in ways that respect both the hegemonic project and the framing of the EES and the EEP; and the fact that the OMC is intimately linked with both the hegemonic project and the EES and EEP means that it fills the place of education. The OMC is conceived as much more than a means of implementation of a programme; it is the link rather than the means of implementing the link. And this, and the accounts of how this is related to the mechanisms and drivers, will be taken up in Chapter 6.

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